UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 1 FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 2 3 4 5 JAMAL KIYEMBA, NEXT FRIEND, ET AL., 6 Appellees, 7 No. 08-5424, et al. v. 8 GEORGE W. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF 9 THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., 10 Appellants. 11 12 Monday, November 24, 2008 13 Washington, D.C. 14 The above-entitled matter came on for oral 15 argument pursuant to notice. 16 BEFORE: 17 CIRCUIT JUDGES HENDERSON AND ROGERS AND SENIOR 18 CIRCUIT JUDGE RANDOLPH 19 **APPEARANCES:** 20 ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS: 21 GREGORY G. GARRE, ESQ. 22 ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEES: 23 SABIN WILLETT, ESQ. 24

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THE	CLERK:	Case nu	umber 08	8-5424,	et	al.,	Jamal	
Kiyemba, Next	Friend,	et al.	versus	George	W.	Bush,	Presi	dent
of the United	States,	et al.,	appel:	lants.	Mr.	Garre	e for	the
Appellants, M	r. Willet	tt for t	he Appe	ellees.				

JUDGE HENDERSON: Mr. Garre. Good morning.

ORAL ARGUMENT OF GREGORY G. GARRE, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

MR. GARRE: Thank you, Judge Henderson, and may it please the Court. With the Court's permission I'd like to reserve three minutes of my time for rebuttal.

The petitioners in these cases are aliens who are being held at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba pending ongoing efforts by the United States to re-settle them to a country that is willing to accept them and provide adequate assurances for their protection. Regrettably, those efforts have not yet proven successful.

After expressing frustration with the lack of success on the diplomatic front the District Court entered an unprecedented order requiring that petitioners be brought to the United States and be released here in the nation's capitol. That extraordinary order is fundamentally flawed in at least three principle respects. First, it contravenes the binding Supreme Court precedent in the Mezei case which establishes that inadmissible aliens may be held indefinitely

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pending efforts to re-settle them to a third county that will accept them. Second --

JUDGE ROGERS: It is true, though, is it not that Mezei was not being in a military prison?

MR. GARRE: That's correct, Your Honor. He was being held in indefinite detention, which is the way that the Supreme Court described in the Zadvydas case on Ellis Island. The petitioners here are being held by the Department of Defense, but they are being held in relatively unrestricted condition on the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, which is to say --

JUDGE ROGERS: And as I understand the Government's position is this is all part of its powers to wind up.

MR. GARRE: I think it's two-fold, Your Honor.

JUDGE ROGERS: All right.

MR. GARRE: We're asserting two different basis for the authority to detain the petitioners during this period.

The first, one basis is the authority to wind up their military detention, as individuals were picked up and determined initially to be enemy combatants, and we believe that historically there is strong precedent for the exercise of that power.

JUDGE ROGERS: Yes.

MR. GARRE: It's been done in every prior conflict for a period of years with respect to at least some individuals, and we think it's supported by the authorization

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for use of military force. But secondly, we think that there

2	is an independent inherent constitutional authority which is
3	recognized by the <i>Mezei</i> case to hold aliens who are
4	apprehended before they get to our borders
5	JUDGE ROGERS: Let me ask you, though, Mezei, the
6	immigration laws were being applied in that, was it not true?
7	MR. GARRE: That's correct, Your Honor.
8	JUDGE ROGERS: Now, in your pleadings to the
9	District Court you indicated that, at least as to <i>Parhat</i> that
10	he was not being detained pursuant to the immigration laws.
11	So, of the two authorities you assert all that's left is the
12	wind up authority?
13	MR. GARRE: Well, I don't think that that's true,
14	Your Honor. I think it is
15	JUDGE ROGERS: What's not true?
16	MR. GARRE: That the only authority left is the wind
17	up authority.
18	JUDGE ROGERS: Well, you said you had two basis for
19	holding him, and I'm just trying to examine those.
20	MR. GARRE: We agree, Your Honor. I think, I mean,
21	you're right that in <i>Mezei</i> the Attorney General did point to a
22	provision in immigration laws to exclude the alien in that
23	case, Mr. Mezei.
24	JUDGE ROGERS: In other words what I'm getting at is
25	you say you have wind up authority and what did you tell me?

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Wind up authority and inherent independent --
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                MR. GARRE: It's an --
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                JUDGE ROGERS: -- authority.
                MR. GARRE: -- inherent authority to --
                JUDGE ROGERS: And you cite Mezei --
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                MR. GARRE: -- to --
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                JUDGE ROGERS: -- and Mezei was applying the
 8
      immigration statutes. So, my question would be Mezei only
 9
      authorizes continued detention under the immigration laws.
                MR. GARRE: Well, I don't think that that's true,
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11
      Your Honor. I think Mezei --
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                JUDGE ROGERS: Well --
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                MR. GARRE: -- was very much a constitutional
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      decision, and I think on page 210 --
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                JUDGE ROGERS: But it was constitutional only as to
     the question of whether he had any due process right to be
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17
     notified of the charges and have a hearing. I mean, it's an
      application of the immigration laws, is it not? That's all
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19
      I'm trying to be clear about.
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                MR. GARRE: And I agree with you that the
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      immigration laws were asserted in that case as a basis for
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      exclusion, but I think there's a different element --
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                JUDGE ROGERS: Okay.
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                MR. GARRE: -- constitutional element of the
25
      separation of powers. And what the court said on 210 of its
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1	decision is that courts have this is from the Mezei court,
2	courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude as a
3	fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the government's
4	political departments largely immune from judicial control.
5	And that's a theme
6	JUDGE ROGERS: And all of that's consistent with
7	Congress having set up the rules of the road in terms of how
8	people get into this country.
9	MR. GARRE: And
10	JUDGE ROGERS: If they get in at all, isn't that
11	correct? And that's what <i>Mezei</i> was dealing with, Congress had
12	set up a statutory scheme and applying it, and looking at the
13	constitution in light of that and said that, you know,
14	whatever Congress says basically is due process as far as an
15	inadmissible alien is concerned.
16	MR. GARRE: Congress has certainly set up a scheme
17	for immigration laws, but I think it's well settled that the
18	Executive, as part of those laws, and as part of inherent
19	constitutional authority has the authority to exclude aliens
20	who wish to come to our country
21	JUDGE ROGERS: And what I'm looking for is a Supreme

Court case, or even a statute that says that. In other words --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: That goes back to the Chinese exclusion cases --

JUDGE ROGERS: Right. 1 2 JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- of more than 100 years ago --3 JUDGE ROGERS: Yes. JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- and there's a line of Supreme 5 Court cases. There's probably about 40 Supreme Court cases by 6 my count that help. 7 MR. GARRE: You're guite right. And the Supreme 8 Court in the Shaughnessy case made clear that this authority 9 stems not -- and I'm quoting from page, it's 338 U.S. 542, "stems not only from the legislative power, but is inherent in 10 executive power to control the foreign affairs of the 11 12 nations." And that is the --13 JUDGE ROGERS: No question about that. But Mr. --14 let me just talk about Parhat if I may here. He filed a 15 habeas petition saying he is being unlawfully detained, and I 16 just want to be clear that the government's position is A. it 17 has the wind up authority, and B. it has unlimited executive 18 power. Now, in your brief you cite no part of the 19 Constitution other than Article One which is the suspension 20 clause, so it's not under that authority. 21 MR. GARRE: Well, I certainly think Article Two, and 22 it's the authority recognized in a long line of --23 JUDGE ROGERS: Well, you don't cite that. 24 MR. GARRE: -- cases. 25 JUDGE ROGERS: It's nowhere cited in your brief.

MR. GARRE: Well, certainly we cite the *Mezei* case, Your Honor, and the Chinese exclusion cases, and this long line of authority which recognizes as part of the constitutional fabric, and part of the Executive's inherent authority to take aliens who have not yet entered the United States, to hold them, and in appropriate circumstances to resettle them to third countries that are willing to accept them.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Mr. Garre, what law governs -JUDGE ROGERS: Right.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- the issue that's presented here?

MR. GARRE: Well, the federal law, the constitutional decisions that we have cited we think are sufficient for the Court to resolve that. Now, we have explained in our brief we think that the petitioners have to point to some either constitutional authority or statutory right to be brought to this country and be released here. And we think that petitioners have cited neither.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Boumediene said look, they have habeas corpus, right, but we're not going to say what the law is that governs. We're not going to say whether the Constitution applies to people held in Guantanamo other than the suspension clause. And we're not going to say whether they have any statutory right. The most I get out of Boumediene is that one can, and you can tweak this out, say

that if there's an evidentiary mistake that's been made in

2 holding an individual, that person is entitled to some relief.

But as far as applying the due process clause or whatever, the

4 Supreme Court didn't say one way or the other.

MR. GARRE: Well, we certainly think you're quite right, Judge Randolph.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: And there's precedent in this circuit to hold, for us to hold that the due process clause applies in Guantanamo would require us to en banc this case because there's a line of precedent in this court saying that aliens without property and without presence in the sovereign territory of the United States have no constitutional rights under the due process clause.

MR. GARRE: That's right, Your Honor. That's the law of this circuit, it's the law of the Supreme Court, which the Supreme Court in the Boumediene case did not revisit or overturn, and you're right, that that is a holding which pertains to the effect of the suspension clause on the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. And I think the Munaf case, which was decided the same day as Boumediene by the Supreme Court, is very important in construing the effect of the suspension clause.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Did the District Court here rely on the due process clause to come up with a remedy that says release these people in Washington, D.C.?

MR. GARRE: Your Honor, I don't think that is, 1 2 it explicitly based its decision on the due process clause. 3 Certainly the District Court reached the conclusion that the Constitution required that these individuals be brought here and released. The only constitutional provision that the 6 Supreme Court has recognized applies on Guantanamo is the 7 suspension clause. The Supreme Court in Boumediene and Munaf 8 made clear that the suspension clause does not require release 9 in every case, that habeas is an equitable remedy, it's an 10 adaptable remedy, and the Munaf case underscores that even 11 where individuals may invoke the writ, and even if they would 12 otherwise be entitled to be released that foreign policies, 13 security considerations can preclude transfer to foreign 14 countries, or preclude in the Munaf case release and transfer 15 to the United States.

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JUDGE RANDOLPH: Is it the government's --

JUDGE ROGERS: Let me ask you, isn't that --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- position that these individuals are terrorists?

MR. GARRE: No, Your Honor, these individuals are not any longer being held as enemy combatants.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: No, no, no. That's a different question. Under the immigration laws anybody that trains in a terrorist camp is not entitled to enter the United States, even if they're training to commit terrorist acts against, not

against the United States but in other countries. So, I ask again, I understand these individuals to the extent that they were, you know, going to engage if they were in hostilities it wasn't against the United States, I think there's some evidence that they were going to engage in activities against China. But my question is within the meaning of the immigration laws are these individual terrorists?

MR. GARRE: And let me answer that by saying first, the government hasn't made a specific determination whether those exclusions would apply. But within the framework of the immigration laws I think it's very likely that they would for this reason, under the immigration laws aliens cannot be brought here and admitted unless it is established clearly and beyond doubt that they have a right to be here, and that's set forth in 8 U.S.C. 1225B(2)(a). And under the terrorist activity exclusions individuals who engage in the use of firearms, train in the use of firearms, and intend to use those for unlawful purposes or endanger other people would fall within the terrorist activity exclusion.

Now, these individuals are, I think each case has to be looked at individually, and so I'm reluctant to put them, lump them all together.

JUDGE ROGERS: That's why I just want to be -MR. GARRE: But yes, broadly --

JUDGE ROGERS: -- clear, it's the wind up authority,

combatants.

it's this inherent sovereign power, and then are you also 1 2 saying that even within the immigration system set up by 3 Congress there -- I just need to be clear, either you're saying that as an alternative basis if the immigration laws 4 5 apply it is the government's position it would be highly 6 unlikely they would be admitted into the United States? 7 MR. GARRE: Yes, that's certainly --8 JUDGE ROGERS: All right. 9 MR. GARRE: -- the government's position. Now, the 10 immigration laws do not, and this gets back to Judge 11 Randolph's --12 JUDGE ROGERS: Do not what? 13 MR. GARRE: -- question --14 JUDGE ROGERS: Yes. 15 MR. GARRE: -- by their terms they do not apply to 16 individuals at Guantanamo Bay, that's express provision of the 17 immigration laws. But if you got to the question of whether 18 they are entitled to be admitted, and again, the burden is on 19 them, a very high burden that Congress has established to show 20 that they're entitled to be admitted. Unless --JUDGE ROGERS: So, let me just so I'm clear, the 21 government is not -- they filed a petition for habeas saying 22 23 there is no authority under which we are lawfully detained, 24 and the government agreed they were no longer enemy

1 MR. GARRE: Yes.

JUDGE ROGERS: And the government elected not to identify another ground, and when the District Court asked whether the government had any evidence these people were dangerous the government elected not to provide the District Court with any evidence.

MR. GARRE: No, that's true, Your Honor. The government's position is that we have the authority to hold these individuals pending re-settlement efforts, that the question of dangerousness or harmlessness while I think it was relevant to the stay ultimately is not relevant or controlling as to the authority to detain them.

JUDGE ROGERS: As to the habeas. So, it's all back down to the wind up authority.

MR. GARRE: The wind up authority and the -JUDGE ROGERS: All right.

MR. GARRE: -- inherent constitutional authority that the Supreme Court recognized in the *Mezei* case, Your Honor.

JUDGE HENDERSON: Can I ask you about the Mezei case? If we treat this as an exclusion proceeding now, because Boumediene has told us they're entitled to have a petition for habeas relief reviewed. And if you'll go to Mezei, do you have it in front of you, a copy of it? At head note seven through nine through nine the court says neither

respondent's harborage on Ellis Island, nor his prior residence here transforms this into something other than an exclusion proceeding.

Now, if you were to say neither the fact that the (indiscernible) are at Guantanamo forcibly, and that they cannot at this point be settled anywhere else does not do anything to change this from an exclusion proceeding. Then the court says he may be habeas corpus test the validity of his exclusion.

Now, that seems to indicate that there's some judicial review, but then at the very end of the opinion the court says we don't have whatever the fears of letting this Mezei in, whatever our individual estimate of that policy and the fears on which is rests his right to enter the U.S. depends on congressional will and courts cannot substitute their judgment for that legislative mandate.

Now, how do you square that with that sentence about by habeas he can challenge the validity of the exclusion if you, just for the purposes of my question, say that we are now at an exclusion proceeding?

MR. GARRE: Right. And I think we're here and we don't contest that these petitioners have the right to come to a habeas court and to say release us, to say that we're entitled to appropriate relief, and we've litigated that, and the relief that the District Court ordered in this case to

1	release them and bring them here to the United States is not a
2	relief that is available to them in habeas, it's not a relief
3	that's available to them under our Constitution or our laws.
4	And so our answer is they have a right to come into court and
5	to invoke their habeas petition rights established by
6	Boumediene, but at the end of the day they're in the same
7	position as Mr. Mezei, neither our Constitution nor our laws
8	entitle them to be brought into the United States and released
9	here.
10	And if I could just in a minute
11	JUDGE ROGERS: Could I just ask, though
12	MR. GARRE: if I have
13	JUDGE ROGERS: Mr. Garre, so I'm clear, has the
14	government taken the position that were they to apply under
15	the immigration laws there is absolutely no basis on which
16	they could be admitted?
17	MR. GARRE: We have
18	JUDGE ROGERS: In other words, has the Department of
19	Homeland Security made any determination in this case?
20	MR. GARRE: No, Your Honor, we haven't made an
21	immigration law decision. They haven't invoked, attempted to
22	invoke that authority. The District Court didn't
23	JUDGE ROGERS: I'll get to that
24	MR. GARRE: analyze it under it. I want to be
25	clear, though, we think it's very unlikely that they would

1 be --

2 JUDGE ROGERS: Oh, I understand your position --

3 MR. GARRE: -- entitled to be --

JUDGE ROGERS: -- you think it's unlikely, but you're not making an argument to this court, are you, that they are barred from pursuing any possible remedy they might have under the immigration statutes established by Congress controlling how aliens can apply for admission?

MR. GARRE: We're not, Your Honor. Of course -JUDGE ROGERS: All right.

MR. GARRE: -- those statutes don't apply to Guantanamo, and I want to be clear that we don't think that they would have any -- we think it's unlikely they would have that right, but the Department of Homeland Security hasn't made that determination, and we're not here today to tell you that.

JUDGE ROGERS: Well --

MR. GARRE: If I could just --

JUDGE ROGERS: -- are you suggesting that because the government -- if I can split up the habeas relief, one is the question about are they detained as enemy combatants? And so the District Court says I'm granting the writ to that extent. Now, the government has chosen for presumably for reasons of convenience and administrative ease to keep them in a military prison facility. Now, is it as a result of that

choice by the government that they are barred from seeking 1 relief under the immigration statutes? 3 MR. GARRE: No, Your Honor. They could attempt to seek relief. We think that they have pointed to no statutory 4 5 right that entitles --6 JUDGE ROGERS: No, no. I just --7 MR. GARRE: -- them to be brought here. 8 JUDGE ROGERS: -- want to know if they're barred. 9 need to be very clear about what the government's position is 10 that when you say the immigration statutes do not apply to 11 Guantanamo does that mean that someone you're holding at 12 Guantanamo pursuant to this wind up authority has no way of 13 exercising any opportunity to pursue relief under the 14 immigration statutes? 15 MR. GARRE: And I think the answer to that is no 16 insofar --17 JUDGE ROGERS: All right. 18 MR. GARRE: -- as they can seek to petition the 19 government in any way that they would find appropriate to attempt to get, for example, parole, or something like that, 20 21 they have no statutory right by which they can exercise that, 22 but they could sort of attempt to pursue that by letters or 23 other mechanisms. JUDGE ROGERS: Well, they filed in the District 24

Court motions for parole into the United States. Now, the

District Court never reached those motions because it declared them to be moot in light of its decision on remedy. But those motions were before the District Court.

MR. GARRE: Well, and in theory the District Court could entertain those if this court reversed the extraordinary order which is quite different before it. But again, I want to be clear, our position is that they have no statutory right to go into court to insist on parole, or admission, or any other immigration law status.

And if I could just, and I realize I've gone over my time, but just discuss briefly the problems of ordering these individuals be brought into the United States. First, that not only overrides the judgment of the political branches on these matters, which pertain to sensitive foreign policy and security considerations. Second --

JUDGE ROGERS: But Congress has set up a scheme even under the Patriot Act that gives discretion to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. And even under Mezei situation the Attorney General had such authority, and ultimately did parole Mr. Mezei into the United States.

MR. GARRE: And certainly --

JUDGE ROGERS: So, those --

MR. GARRE: -- the government --

JUDGE ROGERS: -- decisions have not yet been made,

is that correct?

Τ	MR. GARRE: Inat's correct.
2	JUDGE ROGERS: All right.
3	MR. GARRE: Certainly the government retains that
4	discretion. It could choose to parole individuals in the
5	United States at any point in time. It has determined not to
6	do so to date, it's position is that these individuals should
7	be resettled to foreign countries.
8	The second
9	JUDGE ROGERS: Well, that decision hasn't even been
10	made, has it? I mean, do we have any ruling by the Secretary
11	of Homeland Security?
12	MR. GARRE: No, but certainly, and I want to be
13	clear, I mean, the government's position, and I'm here today
14	to tell you that, is that these individuals
15	JUDGE ROGERS: I know you are, but I don't see any
16	representation about what the Secretary of the Department of
17	Homeland Security has determined in these cases, and that's
18	where the authority under the statutes Congress has created
19	MR. GARRE: It has not made that
20	JUDGE ROGERS: has placed
21	MR. GARRE: specific determination.
22	JUDGE ROGERS: All right.
23	MR. GARRE: But our position, the United States
24	government's position
25	JUDGE RANDOLPH: You represent the President.

MR. GARRE: Representing the President here, our position is that these individuals should not be allowed to enter the United States and should be resettled to a third country. Bringing them here would also interfere in an important respect with the foreign policy efforts to resettle them to other countries, because it is possible that if they were brought here countries that who otherwise might be willing to accept these individuals would much rather have them remain here in the United States.

Bringing them here also could create immigration laws or rights of privileges, it's quite well settled that aliens outside the United States do not enjoy privileges and protections that aliens who come to the United States once they set foot on our shores have protections. And of course, it's reasonable for the government to assume that individuals who have been held by the United States government for several years, many of which is enemy combatants, may not have the United States on their favorite country list, and so it's reasonable for the government to take those considerations into account and make a determination that the appropriate course is to seek to resettle these individuals to a third country that is willing to accept them, provide adequate assurances for their protections, that effort is ongoing and active.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: If they wanted, if any one of these

individuals who wanted to go back to China, you know, fine, you're protecting us, you're not going to send us back to our home country, but I waive that, I want to go back to China, would the United States send them back?

MR. GARRE: Yes. I mean, our position is that they could waive protections that they might otherwise have. The United States policy is that it will not send them back to China because we have not received adequate assurances for their protections, but they could waive that, Your Honor. If there are no further questions.

JUDGE HENDERSON: I just had one question. Did you all get so far, I know Judge Urbina ordered them to come to another hearing, did you all get so far as to discuss if their release was imminent, which it sounded like it was, what their status would be as aliens? I mean, what type of visa, or anything like that, did you get into that?

MR. GARRE: Certainly not with the court, Your

Honor. I mean, they certainly would not be admitted. At most
they might have some status equivalent to a paroled alien.

But I think one of the fundamental problems with the District
Court's order is it was entered outside of the framework of
the immigration laws which aren't addressed to this situation.

The government —

JUDGE ROGERS: Actually, the District Court was prepared to hear from the Department of Homeland Security, and

1	the Department of Homeland Security requested a weeks time to
2	get its views together.
3	MR. GARRE: And obvious
4	JUDGE ROGERS: Isn't that correct?
5	MR. GARRE: I believe that's true, Your Honor.
6	Obviously, the government took
7	JUDGE ROGERS: Yes.
8	MR. GARRE: swift action to being this case to
9	the Court of Appeals to seek a stay because
10	JUDGE ROGERS: Sure.
11	MR. GARRE: fundamentally, regardless of the
12	immigration label that might be placed on them once they're in
13	the United States, the government's position is that the
14	District Court had no right under our laws to order that they
15	be flown to the United States and be released here.
16	JUDGE HENDERSON: All right. Thank you.
17	MR. GARRE: We reserve any time for rebuttal. Thank
18	you
19	JUDGE HENDERSON: Okay.
20	MR. GARRE: Your Honors.
21	JUDGE HENDERSON: We'll give you some time. Mr.
22	Willett.
23	ORAL ARGUMENT OF SABIN WILLETT, ESQ.
24	ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEES
25	MR. WILLETT: Thank you, Judge Henderson, and may it

please the Court. Since the government rests such weight on 1 Mezei let's begin there. I think they're very right to say 3 that we're not concerned about the dissents and posterity and the academics, but they're very wrong about what the holding 4 in Mezei is. Mezei does not hold that the Executive has power 6 to detain indefinitely persons that it is excluding. In fact, 7 habeas is simply the vehicle in Mezei for attacking collaterally an exclusion order. We don't have an exclusion 8 9 order in this case. 10 And in fact, you see from Justice Clark's opinion they go to every extremity to call this thing something other than 11 12 detention. It's a harborage, it's a haven, it's a temporary 13 refuge. Now, the scholarship and the dissents all deride 14 that.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Now, the individual there was free to go but he had nowhere to go.

MR. WILLETT: But he left twice, Your Honor. He left twice --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: But he was free to leave --

MR. WILLETT: He was free to leave.

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JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- but he had no place where he could go.

MR. WILLETT: And our clients are not free to leave, and that's why you see such an extravagant effort in the briefs to --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Well, you heard the --

2 MR. WILLETT: -- refer to this --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- United States just say they can go to China.

MR. WILLETT: Well, that's equivalent to them putting a bullet through their head, Your Honor. I mean, you can read the (indiscernible) association (indiscernible) to see what the State Department thinks of China. This is not something we made up.

The fact is they have nowhere to go, and the government agrees with us on this, that China is inappropriate for these men. And it is indeed a prison. I mean, you don't have to — never mind what they say in their briefs about housing, not a month ago we went to Judge Urbina to see if we could meet our clients at this housing without them being chained to the floor, and they rushed into court saying that's inappropriate, it would be intrusion into our management of a prison. It's a prison, and that's the difference. Mezei is a volunteer, he checks himself in to Ellis Island, and he's free to check himself out, which he does twice, and there's an exclusion order.

Now, all of the government's concerns about its immigration powers are in fact unaffected by this case because when the men are released they are susceptible to deportation. If indeed they could satisfy a panel of, or an immigration

judge on the point that you put, Judge Randolph, then they could be deported if they find a place for them to go. But

JUDGE ROGERS: But let me ask you in the District Court in filing motions for parole into the United States haven't the petitioners acknowledged that this scheme, this statutory scheme established by Congress exists, and for them to gain admission into the United States they are not immune from the immigration laws and consequently that was why they filed a motion for parole?

MR. WILLETT: That's quite right, Your Honor. And we should be clear the parole we sought was *Baker v. Sard* parole that's ancillary to a habeas case, it was not an immigration status.

Now, if Judge Urbina is permitted to go forward and impose the conditions he was on the point of imposing then at that point the government can if it chooses parole them in order to make clear that they have no immigration status, or it can leave them as Martinez and Zadvydas and others have been left with no immigration status at all, it's up to them.

JUDGE ROGERS: I didn't hear that last sentence, sorry.

MR. WILLETT: They have a choice, they can either parole them, which makes clear they have no immigration rights and they can be deported, or they can do nothing, in which

case they will be left as unlawful aliens who are physically present, as I believe was the case for *Martinez* and *Zadvydas*, but who simply can't be detained indefinitely once we've reached the point, as we have reached long ago in this case, where there is no deportation in prospect.

JUDGE ROGERS: Well, I'm just trying to understand the schemes we have here, and if the petition is that the government cannot — has not pointed to any lawful basis for holding them, that is one type of decision. And as I understand the government's argument it's that under the Constitution — these are my words, not the government's words, but under the Constitution Congress has been vested the authority to enact laws regarding the means by which anyone can seek admission into this country.

MR. WILLETT: Sure.

JUDGE ROGERS: And while a habeas writ may issue, nonetheless before you can be admitted into this country there are immigration statutes to be addressed. And their position is that the petitioners have yet to pursue those remedies.

MR. WILLETT: They have said that, Your Honor. But the second we pursue it they're going to say you're not in a place where you're authorized to pursue it.

JUDGE ROGERS: Well, we heard this morning from counsel representing the President of the United States that they are not taking the position that the immigration laws are

unavailable to your clients. Now, whether they succeed under 1 2 the immigration laws is a different question. But at least --3 MR. WILLETT: Right. JUDGE ROGERS: -- as I heard counsel, and he can 4 5 correct me on rebuttal if I've misunderstood his position, 6 they are free notwithstanding their presence in the Guantanamo military prison to pursue any possible remedies they might 7 8 have under the immigration statutes. 9 MR. WILLETT: That may be. I'll be delighted to see 10 if Mr. Garre is smiling behind me to agree with Your Honor's 11 characterization of what he said. But the fact of the matter 12 is that --13 JUDGE ROGERS: Well, I don't want to be uncertain 14 about that. All right? And I question counsel I thought 15 rather closely on that, and he can change his position if he wants to on rebuttal, but as I understood it, and I would 16 17 leave this courtroom at this moment with the understanding the 18 United States was not taking the position --19 MR. WILLETT: Well, Your Honor --20 JUDGE ROGERS: -- that they did not pursue remedies 21 under the immigration laws. 22 MR. WILLETT: As would I. But I've often been 23 disappointed after --24 JUDGE ROGERS: All right. Well, answer the 25 question.

1	MR. WILLETT: I've left courtrooms. But the
2	point I would make here is that it is no substitute for habeas
3	for me to be able to pursue a discretionary remedy with the
4	President. And that's all immigration you might well do
5	that, and they might reject it, but it's not a substitute for
6	getting released from a prison.
7	JUDGE RANDOLPH: You're saying that your clients
8	might apply, or will apply for admission pursuant to the
9	immigration laws, is that
10	MR. WILLETT: If they're here we have to see what
11	the government does with us.
12	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Why do they have to be here to make
13	application?
14	MR. WILLETT: Because there's a
15	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Why don't they make application
16	where they are now? Most aliens in fact probably, and, you
17	know, I don't know what the numbers are, but the aliens
18	seeking to come to this country from Europe, and from Africa,
19	and from the Middle East and whatever they don't say hey, I
20	have to come to the United States in order to apply for
21	admission. They make their applications overseas.
22	MR. WILLETT: Your Honor
23	JUDGE RANDOLPH: So, why can't your
24	MR. WILLETT: the statute is geographically
25	specific, and the government's brief points this out, it's

geographically specific about where you have to have dry feet to make such an application, and Guantanamo Bay is not such a place. In fact, other people have attempted this and have failed. The government itself in it's brief says that we don't have standing to seek that remedy.

But my point simply is to say even if we did, the fact that we could go ask for mercy from the very branch of government that is imprisoning us today is no substitute from release from a prisons, and that's --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Well, suppose --

MR. WILLETT: -- what we've asked for.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- there are people held in Afghanistan under the same circumstances, they were caught in Tora Bora, you know, doing weapons training and they are from Western China, do those people -- and the government says no, no, no, they're not enemy combatants, the United States holds them, where the coalition of forces was I don't think it matters, are they entitled to be released into the United States?

MR. WILLETT: No, Your Honor. I mean, first of all, that's happened often, and those people are released in Afghanistan. But it happens at the time, it happens shortly after capture, and --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Well, suppose it's a month, and what is shortly after? Suppose it's two months.

MR. WILLETT: I don't know where to draw the line, but it's not six years, Your Honor.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: If people are training in terrorist activities, and I'm not saying one way or the other because I don't know that there's a clear determination about your clients, but we have — suppose there are individuals who are trained terrorists and they're going back to whatever the country is, whether it's Russia, or China, or whatever, the United States captures, determines that they're not against the United States, not enemy combatants, but no other country in the world wants them because they're terrorists, do they have to be released into the United States? Isn't that your position?

MR. WILLETT: That is not my position, Your Honor. First of all, if they were such people, they might well, depending on their affiliation, fall within the authorization for the use of military force. And I can't let this moment go by without saying that every single thing that has ever been alleged about our clients and what they did, you and I can do this weekend 23 miles from here at a gun camp in Virginia. I mean, there is nothing terrorist about what is alleged about these people. And we have this cloud of that word that hovers over the case, but on every case, including when Judge Urbina asked them --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: No, we could do it in Virginia, we

can also do it, the same kind of training at Paris Island.

MR. WILLETT: Your Honor, tearing down a firearm and putting it back together and shooting at a target which is 100 percent of what's been alleged here is something that is not even military, and it's something millions of Americans do, and ought to do, and it's lawful to do, and it doesn't make these people somehow --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: What kind of firearms were they?

MR. WILLETT: There was a semi-automatic weapon, and there was a pistol. Mainly they didn't have ammunition is what I understand. But the fact of the matter is you'd be hard-pressed in Afghanistan in 2001 to find a village that didn't have a semi-automatic weapon in it. There was nothing hostile about this, there was no direct evidence of any kind of intent to do harm to anyone.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Suppose there was.

MR. WILLETT: That's a different case.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Well, I know that. But does the district judge's decision depend upon whether these individuals were training to commit terrorist acts in China or not?

MR. WILLETT: The district judge's decision depends upon whether there is a lawful basis authorized by Congress for the President to hold them in a prison.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Is that a yes or a no? I mean,

does the --1 2 MR. WILLETT: Well --3 JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- District Court's decision depend upon whether the individuals were training in terrorist 4 5 activities? I can't because he --6 MR. WILLETT: I --7 JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- made no factual determination of 8 that. 9 MR. WILLETT: Well, that's not correct, Your Honor, 10 because the government ran up the white flag and it said we 11 don't have any basis to detain these people, so there was no 12 occasion for Judge Urbina to make a factual determination. 13 JUDGE RANDOLPH: Would the United States have a 14 basis for detaining people who were planning to commit 15 terrorist activities in China? 16 MR. WILLETT: Not unless there was an --17 JUDGE RANDOLPH: No, not --18 MR. WILLETT: -- association with --19 JUDGE RANDOLPH: No. 20 MR. WILLETT: -- the Taliban or --21 JUDGE RANDOLPH: No. So the United States would say 22 we don't have any basis under the authorization for military 23 force to detain people who were going to commit terrorist 24 acts, not against us, but against China. 25 MR. WILLETT: Your Honor, the actual terrorist act

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would be a crime under our law and the law of China, and --
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                JUDGE RANDOLPH: Not an actual.
 3
                MR. WILLETT: -- it might be --
                JUDGE RANDOLPH: I'm talking about training.
                MR. WILLETT: Well, I mean the planning for such an
 6
      act.
 7
                JUDGE RANDOLPH: If they did training now, if
 8
      anybody that is in any of these camps, was in any of these
 9
      camps in Tora Bora, if they were training now they would be
10
      committing a criminal offense.
11
                MR. WILLETT: Training to --
12
                JUDGE RANDOLPH: Because the organization has been
13
      deemed by the State Department to be a terrorist organization.
14
                MR. WILLETT: Yes, if they were --
15
                JUDGE RANDOLPH: The organization that --
16
                MR. WILLETT: -- if they --
                JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- trained them is now considered
17
18
      on the --
19
                MR. WILLETT: Right.
20
                JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- State Department's list as a
21
     terrorist --
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                MR. WILLETT: Well --
23
                JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- organization.
24
                MR. WILLETT: -- wait a minute, Your Honor, there's
25
     nothing in this record that says these people were part of
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that organization. In fact, I urge you to look at the
 1
      citations --
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                JUDGE RANDOLPH: No, I'm talking about --
                MR. WILLETT: -- on the government's brief.
 5
                JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- whether they were part of it,
 6
      I'm talking about whether they were trained by it.
 7
                MR. WILLETT: Well, I don't know what the difference
 8
      is, Your Honor.
 9
                JUDGE ROGERS: But is --
                JUDGE RANDOLPH: Well, the difference is a federal
10
11
      felony offense, that's the difference under --
12
                JUDGE ROGERS: You know --
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                JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- 18 U.S.C. 2339(d).
14
                JUDGE ROGERS: Of course who was it, Zadvydas or
      Clark who had been convicted of several felonies?
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16
                MR. WILLETT: Yes.
17
                JUDGE ROGERS: I mean, that's not what the
18
      government's argument is here, as I understand it. Their
19
      argument is they are maintaining these people at Guantanamo
20
      under inherent constitutional authority of the sovereign to
21
     hold people in the interest of national security, and as part
22
      of the wind up authority. And as I understand your position
23
     it's that they are being held in a military prison, and that,
24
      and I want to be clear about this, were they moved, for
25
      example, to Ellis Island would you have the same argument?
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MR. WILLETT: Your Honor, we would still have a remedy in habeas, but the argument would be different, because the movement to Ellis Island would have been contrived by the government as opposed to Mezei's movement who goes there on his own. The fact is we're — and this is something the government didn't talk about in their argument, but Boumediene held that the habeas judge has to have power to order release. This court in Parhat directed the government to release or transfer Parhat five months and four days ago.

So, if you don't have that power, if the only result is that you shift someone to Ellis Island, that that's a contrivance against the release remedy, which in this unusual case --

JUDGE ROGERS: As I understood it, though, the argument could be that it's not a contrivance in the sense that the government has removed him from Guantanamo, so he is no longer there. But as with Mr. Mezei, he is being held pursuant to the immigration statutes.

MR. WILLETT: You know, Your Honor, we looked at that case, which came up in their reply, and it turns out there's another decision that no one cited from the Second Circuit called *Bradley v. Watkins*, the citation is 163 F.2d 328, and that's a Norwegian civilian who was captured just before the Second World War and brought to Ellis Island, and it goes up to the Second Circuit, and a panel of the Second

Circuit says that he cannot be held in a prison pending deportation. In fact, I don't know what the difference would be here.

What we're really talking about in this case is where do these people go while the government attempts to deport them?

Why do they sit in a military prison? They're not enemy combatants.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: What law are you invoking? Are you relying on the common law of habeas as it existed in 1789?

MR. WILLETT: Yes, Your Honor, I'm saying there's an absence of a legal basis to detain them. In *Boumediene* it was held that the government has to come up with a legal basis to detain them. The only basis they pointed to was the AUMF, and then they abandoned that when asked for evidence by the habeas judge. So, where's there a null set, where there's nothing the petitioner is entitled to release, and that's one of the holdings of *Boumediene*.

JUDGE ROGERS: I mean, I found the Amikas (phonetic sp.) briefs to be very helpful in this case, but what I haven't found is all of these cases talk about release, but they don't tell us a lot about what that means because it's perfectly obvious in the context. And even in Boumediene where the Supreme Court talks about release may not always be the appropriate remedy, that habeas is flexible, etcetera, and they cite a case where the petitioner was held for re-trial --

1	MR. WILLETT: Right.
2	JUDGE ROGERS: because charges were pending. So,
3	the argument might run here, although it's not the argument as
4	I have heard it from the government, that they are being held
5	if the process were to move forward under our immigration
6	statutes. And
7	MR. WILLETT: Well
8	JUDGE ROGERS: the alternative argument in the
9	government's brief is that it should be given an opportunity
10	since it only recently decided not to pursue new CSRT
11	hearings, an opportunity to proceed under the immigration
12	laws, although they said, you know, your clients have failed
13	to apply.
14	MR. WILLETT: Well, a couple of points to unpack,
15	Your Honor. On August 4th they ran up the white flag on
16	Parhat.
17	JUDGE ROGERS: Yes.
18	MR. WILLETT: On August 18th they did the same with
19	four other of these petitioners.
20	JUDGE ROGERS: Yes.
21	MR. WILLETT: And it wasn't until September 30th
22	that they had to in fact
23	JUDGE ROGERS: Yes.
24	MR. WILLETT: put their chips on the table, they
25	had every opportunity to say this was an immigration case.

24

25

- And call me fussy, but if I don't plead something I usually 1 2 get -- I don't get a chance to come up to the Court of 3 Appeals --JUDGE ROGERS: Well, interestingly --5 MR. WILLETT: -- and plead it there. 6 JUDGE ROGERS: -- and it was not included in the 7 voluminous record submitted for this case, but it is part of 8 the District Court record, in opposing Parhat's motion for 9 parole, and I understand it was collateral to habeas, 10 nevertheless, the government did make these arguments that it 11 is now making to this court. So, those arguments were before 12 the District Court, and he did not address them. 13 MR. WILLETT: It's true, Your Honor, although 14 they've never filed a return, and they never -- you know, 15 they're supposed to certify the true cause of the jailing. And this, Judge Randolph, I neglected to say to you, we also 16 17 have a statutory right under 2243 and 2241, because we're not 18 enemy combatants, we're not carved out by the strip. And --JUDGE RANDOLPH: Okay. Assume 2241 applies. 19 20 MR. WILLETT: Right. 21 JUDGE RANDOLPH: And that says that you're entitled 22
 - JUDGE RANDOLPH: And that says that you're entitled to the writ if you're being held in violation of the law or the Constitution or treaties, but put that aside, are you claiming that your clients are being held in violation of the Constitution?

1	MR. WILLETT: The law and the Constitution, Your
2	Honor.
3	JUDGE RANDOLPH: No, but what provision of the
4	Constitution?
5	MR. WILLETT: The suspension clause, which runs
6	to
7	JUDGE RANDOLPH: But the suspension
8	MR. WILLETT: Guantanamo.
9	JUDGE RANDOLPH: clause has no the suspension
10	clause is you have a right to habeas corpus. I'm dealing with
11	2241, that doesn't mean everybody that has a right to a writ
12	of habeas corpus under 2241 has a right to release. You
13	MR. WILLETT: No, you have to
14	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Right, it has to show it's a
15	violation of some other provision of the Constitution, so what
16	is it?
17	MR. WILLETT: Well, it impresses upon the
18	government, the jailer, the obligation to justify in law the
19	detention.
20	JUDGE RANDOLPH: What provision of the Constitution
21	is it that's being violated?
22	MR. WILLETT: I think that is the read of the
23	suspension clause under Boumediene, Your Honor.
24	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Wait a minute. If the suspension
25	clause invokes the regular writ of habeas corpus, you know, 28

U.S.C. 2241, then you're into that whole line of cases,
thousands of cases in this country that say you have to show a
specific provision of the Constitution that's being violated
by holding you, and you don't come back and say ah, 2241,
habeas corpus, that's not the answer. You've got to show the
Fourth Amendment, is it the, you know, is it the Fifth
Amendment, is it the Eighth Amendment, you know, is it the due
process clause, which one?

MR. WILLETT: It is as least so much of the due process clause that involves holding somebody indefinitely in a prison. That you can tease at least out of Zadvydas, Your Honor. And that is consistent with the suspension clause (indiscernible).

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Well, this gets back to the point that I mentioned to General Garre, and they're -- the cases in our court hold that there is no due process right of an alien who's never been in the United States and has no property here.

MR. WILLETT: Well, Your Honor, there's no -
JUDGE RANDOLPH: So, the Supreme Court didn't say

one way or the other, they said all right, writ of habeas

corpus, that's it, but we're not telling you what the law is

that governs it. Our court says there are no due process

rights.

MR. WILLETT: Your Honor, your court has said

25

organizations.

there's no due process right to entry, to gain admission. 1 2 JUDGE RANDOLPH: No, no, no. That's not what it 3 said. That's not what it said. The case is People's Mujah Hadin v. Secretary of State I think is the name of it. I've 4 got it somewhere. 6 MR. WILLETT: That's the case about the records, I 7 believe, Your Honor. 8 JUDGE RANDOLPH: Yes, and there are other cases, 9 too. There's a 22 Sovereignty, there's -- I don't know. There's at least three or four decisions in our court that 10 11 hold that. So --12 MR. WILLETT: The --13 JUDGE RANDOLPH: Oh, here it is. It's -- I don't 14 think the parties cite this, it's 182 F.3d at page 22, and it 15 says a foreign alien without property or presence, I'm 16 reading, in this country has no constitutional rights under 17 the due process clause. 18 MR. WILLETT: But he was not in a prison, Your 19 Honor. He was just contesting whether I believe he could be 20 deported. And we concede that --JUDGE RANDOLPH: No, that was not a -- that was a 21 22 terrorist case. 23 MR. WILLETT: All right. It was whether an

organization would be designated as one of these

1 JUDGE RANDOLPH: Right.

MR. WILLETT: It wasn't about whether somebody was in a prison, the most fundamental point of habeas corpus. And the problem is here, if you think about it just last week Judge Leon issued an order in the Boumediene case, and in fact, Boumediene himself was ordered to be, I think the order was that the government go about forthwith engaging in diplomacy to arrange his return home, which there's no reason to think that won't work in that case, and in most cases.

What if it doesn't work? What does Judge Leon do then?

Does he throw up his hands and he's all done? Boumediene sits in the isolation cell where he is this morning?

JUDGE ROGERS: Well, that's what Judge Robertson did.

MR. WILLETT: That was three years ago, Your Honor, before the -- in effect, if you look at the first 18 pages of the classified record the government has proved in spades they are not going to succeed with this resettlement, they have been at it for four years, they have tried everywhere in the world, they have worked judiciously, and the judge had a factual record before him that the imprisonment had long ago become indefinite.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Yes, but that's *Mezei*, that's exactly -- the Supreme Court said if the government can't relocate the individual they have to hold, they have -- what

1 are they going to do?

2 MR. WILLETT: Your Honor, Mezei --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: The other option in the Supreme Court in the Mezei case was release the individual into the United States, and the Supreme Court said no, that's not an option.

MR. WILLETT: They said that's not an option with respect to a volunteer who comes to the doorstep and knocks.

We have people who were brought here to a military prison.

Think about it this way, there are 10 military facilities within 400 miles of Miami Beach, habeas corpus runs to every one of them. If the pilot of that C-17 lands at Eglin, or Jacksonville, or Pensacola Naval Air Station those men are free like Martinez years ago. But because he lands at Guantanamo they sit there forever. That's not a great writ, Your Honor, that's a flight plan. And how can we say, how can we give any meaning to the Boumediene decision if it turns on the flight plan of the C-17?

JUDGE RANDOLPH: Well, it's the same thing with Mexico. The Supreme Court has held that the, you know, the Constitution doesn't extend with -- if the United States agents go into Mexico and that's their flight plan and they grab an alien there and bring him back that he doesn't have a Fourth Amendment right to probable cause or anything else. So, what's the difference between what the Supreme Court held

1	in that case I can't pronounce, you know which one I'm talking
2	about, and your hypothetical? It's the same thing.
3	MR. WILLETT: Six years in a military prison is the
4	difference.
5	JUDGE RANDOLPH: That guy was convicted of drug
6	offenses, and he's probably spending 30 years in prison.
7	MR. WILLETT: And our clients are not even warriors,
8	they're civilians. They're not charged with a crime, they're
9	not our enemies. I realize I've gone long over my time, and I
10	also realize that it takes awhile to write decisions, but you
11	did enter a stay, and if this Court could possibly vacate that
12	stay and let Judge Urbina get back to the work of conditioning
13	this release as he was on the point of doing we would be most
14	grateful. Thank you.
15	JUDGE ROGERS: All right.
16	THE CLERK: No time remaining.
17	JUDGE HENDERSON: Okay. Why don't you take a couple
18	of minutes?
19	ORAL ARGUMENT OF GREGORY G. GARRE, ESQ.
20	ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
21	MR. GARRE: Thank you, Your Honors. Let me be clear
22	at the outset that the United States' position is not that the
23	resettlement efforts are hopeless. There are active, ongoing
24	discussions right now and the United States is doing its best

to resettle these people to a third country that will accept

1 them. Second --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: To pick up on the petitioners's argument, they say that you have no legal authority to hold them any longer. What is your legal authority?

MR. GARRE: Well, it's two-fold, it's the wind up authority, and it's the authority in *Mezei* to take aliens who wish to enter the United States and to hold them so that they do not unlawfully enter the United States until you can resettle them to a country that is willing to accept them.

That's a constitutional decision in *Mezei*. The political branches have also -- Congress has made clear that the Executive need not admit aliens that it determines is not in the United States interest to admit.

The Boumediene case, to get back to Mr. Willett's point, as you recognize, Judge Rogers, it doesn't hold that the suspension clause requires release in every case, in fact, it specifically says that release it not required in every case on page 2266 of the decision.

JUDGE ROGERS: But the one --

MR. GARRE: The Munaf --

JUDGE ROGERS: -- cite the court gave was where there were charges pending against the petitioner, and so back to Judge Randolph's question, if the wind up authority has exhausted itself because it's gone on for so many years unsuccessfully, and these current proceedings have not helped

that process, and the District Court found therefore these 1 2 petitioners are facing indefinite detention, the government's 3 reliance on *Mezei* suggests that you can't hold him in a military prison as distinct from providing an accommodation to 4 5 him, such as Ellis Island. 6 MR. GARRE: Well --7 JUDGE ROGERS: I mean, we've never thought of Ellis 8 Island in the same way we think of Guantanamo military 9 facilities. 10 MR. GARRE: Two points on that, Your Honor. First, Mezei makes clear that you can hold them indefinitely, that's 11 12 the way the court, the Supreme Court described it in Zadvydas, 13 and Mr. Mezei had been held for three years by the time of the 14 decision. Second, the fact that they're being held in 15 Guantanamo Bay, many aliens have been held on Guantanamo Bay. Haitian refugees who have been interdicted at sea brought 16 17 involuntarily to Guantanamo Bay --18 JUDGE ROGERS: I was going to ask you --19 MR. GARRE: -- and brought back --20 JUDGE ROGERS: -- what about -- are all those people 21 still being held in the immigration camps in Florida? 22 MR. GARRE: No, Your Honor. Well, the vast majority 23 of the Haitians that were brought to Guantanamo Bay were held 24 there and then brought back to Haiti, or resettled to other 25 countries. In the 1980s and 1990s there were hundreds of

Mariel Cubans who sought to enter this country, were interdicted, and then were -- the United States undertook efforts to re-send them to other third countries that would take them where they were safe. Many of those individuals were held for several years, as long as a decade until they could be resettled.

So, although the petitioners' situation is certainly regrettable, it is not unprecedented. And the fact that they are being held on Guantanamo Bay doesn't give them a right to be brought into the United States.

JUDGE ROGERS: Of course, again, these were all people who were voluntarily seeking admission, and even in the case you rely on in *Munaf* the Supreme Court noted that the U.S. citizens had voluntarily gone to Iraq where they were facing criminal charges. So, I want to be clear, is it the government's position that in connection with a habeas petition that the District Court would lack authority to direct the government to remove the petitioners from a military prison, and perhaps it has authority to hold them somewhere else, but cannot continue to hold them in a military prison?

MR. GARRE: Our position is that the District Court lacks the authority to order that they be brought to the United States. The District Court would lack the authority to say you can't hold them on Guantanamo Bay, you have to bring

them to Ellis Island. That transfer itself, and now Mr. --1 2 JUDGE ROGERS: So, in other words, after all these 3 years of fighting about habeas corpus, whether under the statute or the Constitution, if the United States policy means 4 5 that a person cannot be returned to the country of which they 6 are a citizen, then they can be indefinitely held in the 7 military prison from which they are seeking relief? 8 MR. GARRE: Well, they can be indefinitely held, 9 Your Honor, that's clear. Now, when the Parhat --JUDGE ROGERS: Well, it's a military prison, 10 11 correct? 12 MR. GARRE: They could be held by the Department of 13 Defense. But I want to be clear, Your Honor, when the 14 Parhat --15 JUDGE ROGERS: Is it a military prison? Be clear about that. 16 17 MR. GARRE: They are being held by the Department of 18 Defense. Now, petitioners --19 JUDGE ROGERS: In a military prison? 20 MR. GARRE: -- describe it as a military prison, 21 Your Honor, and we could debate about whether any detention 22 facility operated by the Department of Defense is a military 23 prison. The point that I want to make is, that I would like 24 to make is that when these individuals were determined not to 25

be enemy combatants they were taken out of the restrictive

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conditions where the enemy combatants are being held at
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      Guantanamo Bay and put into an entirely different facility
 3
     with much --
                JUDGE ROGERS: What I want to be --
                MR. GARRE: -- less restrictive conditions.
 6
                JUDGE RANDOLPH: There's a prison on Ellis Island.
 7
     I guess Mr. Mezei was in a prison --
 8
                JUDGE ROGERS: No, no, no.
 9
                JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- that the Supreme Court decision
10
      doesn't turn on that, does it?
11
                MR. GARRE: Well, I think that that's correct, Your
12
      Honor.
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                JUDGE ROGERS: But what I'm trying --
14
                MR. GARRE: And certainly --
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                JUDGE ROGERS: -- to get at is whether the
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      government's position is that a habeas petition reaches the
17
      conditions of confinement, as well as the ultimate question of
18
      release.
19
                MR. GARRE: It doesn't prevent a habeas court to
      dictate the conditions of confinement. I think there are
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21
     many --
22
                JUDGE ROGERS: Well, we heard --
23
                MR. GARRE: -- decisions --
24
                JUDGE ROGERS: -- a representative of the President
25
     tell us just the other day in one of these Guantanamo cases
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1	that habeas is very broad, and so there's no need for judicial
2	review of these CSRTs because habeas can handle everything.
3	So, the question I have is if habeas is so broad then why does
4	it not reach conditions of confinement? Indeed, we have an en
5	banc case from this circuit that says habeas can reach
6	conditions of confinement, albeit in the mental health
7	context. But at least that's the law of the circuit at this
8	point.
9	MR. GARRE: And I think there are many decisions
10	from other circuits, and I think there is
11	JUDGE ROGERS: Well, we're in this circuit.
12	JUDGE RANDOLPH: And the Supreme Court.
13	MR. GARRE: And the Supreme Court.
14	JUDGE RANDOLPH: And the Supreme Court that holds
15	that even for citizens habeas doesn't reach conditions of
16	confinement. If you have a problem with that you bring a
17	(indiscernible) action, or a 1983 action.
18	MR. GARRE: That's correct, Your Honor. And these
19	individuals were taken immediately out of custody as enemy
20	combatants and put into the separate housing where they have
21	free access within the housing, access to DVDs, access to

JUDGE RANDOLPH: General Garre, I just wanted to ask you, you mentioned the Supreme Court's statement several times and it's opinion in *Boumediene*, we called it *Boumediene* when

special libraries, special housing facilities, and the like.

it was in this court, but I don't know. Boumediene, is that what you call it now? But the court said that you have to be able to order conditional release, it was those two words, conditional release. Do you know what the court meant by, what is conditional release?

MR. GARRE: I don't know specifically what the court meant in *Boumediene*. I think you could argue that petitioners have conditional release here insofar as they can be ordered to be released to a third country that they have a right to enter. Right now --

JUDGE RANDOLPH: They're released on condition that we can find a country to take you.

MR. GARRE: That's right.

JUDGE RANDOLPH: So, the Supreme Court never really defined what it meant by conditional release, but what I'm wondering is exactly what you said, whether in fact these people are already conditionally released.

MR. GARRE: I mean, that certainly would be our position, Your Honor. And I think in thinking about what Boumediene said we also think you have to look at Munaf decided the same day, and of course in thinking about what the suspension clause means you have to look at Mezei which interpreted the writ in that case.

It is regrettable the situation that these petitioners are in. The United States is doing its best to find a third

country that is willing to accept them, but the United States courts lack the authority to order that these petitioners be brought to the United States and be released in the nation's capitol. If there are no --

JUDGE ROGERS: Well, I think it's interesting that even in the brief in this court, the United States refers to these petitioners as being a threat to national security. I mean, that's the innuendo stated in the brief without any citation, it refers to their dangerousness. So, I mean, we have to be clear where the United States is on this if there's going to be any success to getting another country to accept these petitioners.

MR. GARRE: And I think you're right, Your Honor, that you have to be careful insofar as it could impact resettlement efforts. Certainly Congress has made a categorical determination that aliens who may have engaged in terrorist activities as described in the statute, including aliens who have engaged in military style training and who intend to do harm to others are not entitled to be admitted. I think any --

JUDGE ROGERS: But I think isn't there a lot in your brief that we have yet to know how the Department of Homeland Security is going to interpret this? You may be 100 percent right, but we don't know that.

MR. GARRE: Your Honor --

JUDGE ROGERS: I mean, none of this has happened yet.

MR. GARRE: That's true, Your Honor. And again, as I indicated to Judge Randolph earlier, our position on behalf of the President is that these individuals are not entitled to be admitted to the United States. But to get back to our exchange, it is true that the United States' position is that these individuals may seek whatever avenues are available to them under the immigration law that they may seek visas as aliens outside the United States.

JUDGE ROGERS: And that the government would not file a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the immigration laws do not apply to someone who is housed pending rendition at Guantanamo.

MR. GARRE: Well, I think that the laws are very specific about how they apply --

JUDGE ROGERS: So, does that mean you would file a motion to dismiss on that ground?

MR. GARRE: The individuals here, to take an example, Your Honor, I think you have to look at the different immigration law avenues, they could petition others to seek refuge status. Now, that's a discretionary thing that the Executive can grant. They would have no right of judicial review to challenge that, but certainly the United States wouldn't challenge their efforts to petition for refugee

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     status.
                JUDGE ROGERS: On the ground that those laws don't
 3
     apply to Guantanamo?
               MR. GARRE: Well --
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 5
                JUDGE RANDOLPH: They'd apply to individuals, it's
 6
     not geographically based.
 7
               MR. GARRE: Right. Any alien --
 8
                JUDGE RANDOLPH: Yes.
               MR. GARRE: -- can apply --
10
               JUDGE RANDOLPH: Anywhere in the world --
               MR. GARRE: -- for refugee status --
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12
                JUDGE RANDOLPH: -- you can file for
13
      (indiscernible).
               MR. GARRE: -- or parole. I mean, parole is a
14
15
     purely discretionary determination.
16
                JUDGE ROGERS: So, are you reading --
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               MR. GARRE: They would not --
18
                JUDGE ROGERS: -- that provision in the immigration
19
      statute simply to mean the immigration laws as such don't
20
      apply to the island of Guantanamo, or the --
21
               MR. GARRE: Yes.
22
                JUDGE ROGERS: -- island on which --
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               MR. GARRE: There's --
24
                JUDGE ROGERS: -- Guantanamo is located?
25
               MR. GARRE: -- no -- individuals, aliens held on
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Guantanamo are no different for immigration law purposes than aliens held in Tora Bora and Afghanistan where these individuals initially were. That's the import of the provision of immigration laws which makes clear that those rights do not extend to Guantanamo. But that doesn't prevent an alien from Afghanistan from seeking to gain admission to the United States, and similarly these petitioners could seek to take advantage of those discretionary avenues.

JUDGE ROGERS: I mean, what I'm trying to understand is simply when we talk about meaningful relief it is not 10

is simply when we talk about meaningful relief it is not 10 more years of litigation as to whether the immigration laws apply to Guantanamo. That's what I'm trying to understand in your position representing the President today.

MR. GARRE: The immigration laws do not apply to Guantanamo, Your Honor. The Executive could make a discretionary decision to grant these petitioners or any other aliens parole to the United States. That's a decision the Executive could make. It is not made that --

JUDGE ROGERS: And could the Executive also make a decision on admission?

MR. GARRE: The Executive could make a decision on temporary admission, I believe, Your Honor.

JUDGE ROGERS: On permanent admission?

MR. GARRE: Subject only to the exclusions that Congress has specified, including the terrorist activity

1	exclusion. I think that parole would be the discretionary
2	immigration law box that probably would most likely apply
3	here. Now, the government's position is that these
4	individuals should not be paroled into the United States, and
5	that the District Court had no right to order that they be
6	brought into the United States.
7	And fundamentally, whatever avenues they might pursue
8	under the immigration laws, we're here today because the
9	District Court ordered that they be brought into the United
10	States and released here.
11	JUDGE RANDOLPH: Is Mr. Willett correct that only
12	two of the individuals were, there was evidence that only two
13	of them received what you call military-type training?
14	MR. GARRE: I think that that's incorrect, Your
15	Honor. I think that many of the individuals and each case
16	has to be considered individually, we certainly agree with
17	that. But many of them, if not most of them under my
18	understanding have admitted to participating in training camps
19	in Afghanistan.
20	JUDGE ROGERS: Counsel
21	MR. GARRE: Now, they've argued that
22	JUDGE RANDOLPH: And the
23	JUDGE ROGERS: you know, you cannot make that
24	representation

JUDGE RANDOLPH: May I just follow up --

JUDGE ROGERS: -- based on the evidence in this record. I mean, we have to be very careful here. The petitioners made certain representations in their brief, you did not dispute them in your reply brief, you did not dispute them in the District Court. So, let's be very careful here before we taint people without evidence.

MR. GARRE: Your Honor, and I agree. I want to be clear, though, to follow up on that, I'm not saying that by acknowledging that they attended a training camp that they have taken the position that those training camps were terrorist related. Certainly, their position is that they are not. These were --

JUDGE ROGERS: They weren't --

MR. GARRE: They were not.

JUDGE ROGERS: -- terrorist organizations when they were there. It was afterward. I mean, there are so many different things. But we're not getting into the evidence here, but it's just that these statements are made, and when the government had an opportunity when the District Court specifically requested information, the government elected not to provide any evidence. So, that's the record this court is dealing with.

MR. GARRE: And Your Honor, I was referring to statements in the (indiscernible) records, the unclassified records that are before the court in the joint appendix. But

I do want to be clear, Your Honor --1 2 JUDGE RANDOLPH: I didn't ask you for a finding, I 3 asked you whether there was any evidence in the record. MR. GARRE: And I believe -- right. 5 JUDGE RANDOLPH: And you answered me correctly, 6 there was. 7 MR. GARRE: Right. 8 JUDGE RANDOLPH: So --9 MR. GARRE: But I certainly want to be clear, 10 because I agree with Judge Rogers, we have to be very careful 11 on this, that any threat assessment we believe is for the 12 Executive to make has to be made on a case-by-case basis, 13 and --JUDGE HENDERSON: And Mezei says that. Mezei in the 14 15 very last sentence says whatever our individual estimate of that policy and the fears on which it rests it is for the 16 17 Congressional will and we cannot substitute our judgment. Any 18 more questions? 19 MR. GARRE: That's correct, Your Honor. 20 JUDGE HENDERSON: All right, we're going to take a 21 recess, and the Clerk is going to clear the courtroom because 22 we have some classified questions we want to ask. 23 MR. GARRE: Thank you, Your Honor. 24 (Recess.)

DIGITALLY SIGNED CERTIFICATE

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcription of the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Caula Un Da Wood

Paula Underwood

November 27, 2008

DEPOSITION SERVICES, INC.